CROSSROADS: Middle East, Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa

Here is a summary of the most important events that unfolded over the last month in the Middle East/North Africa, Asia (ex-China/India/Japan), Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa, and which may affect economic, financial, and geopolitical issues in the months ahead.

Top News This Month

Sudan’s civil war entered a dangerous new phase around El Obeid, North Kordofan, where intensified fighting and drone strikes on schools, fuel depots, and water infrastructure have raised UN warnings that up to 500,000 civilians could be at risk, echoing tactics seen before mass atrocities in El Fasher last year.

Venezuela is grappling with the aftermath of twin June 24 earthquakes that killed more than 4,700 people and caused an estimated $37 billion in direct damage, prompting a $298 million UN emergency appeal as recovery shifts from search-and-rescue to a recovery effort expected to span years.

More than 500 people are feared dead after two boats carrying Rohingya refugees capsized off Myanmar’s coast, part of a worsening pattern tied to the country’s six-year civil war, as Bangladesh moves to fence 108 kilometers of its border with Myanmar in response to a security vacuum left by the Arakan Army’s takeover of Rakhine State.

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Ebola outbreak, caused by a strain with no vaccine or treatment, has surpassed 2,000 confirmed cases and 750 deaths and is now the third-largest on record, even as security forces separately used excessive force against protesters opposing a bill that could open the door to a third term for President Tshisekedi.

Middle East & North Africa

Sudan’s civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has entered a dangerous new phase centered on El Obeid, the strategic capital of North Kordofan, where intensified fighting, drone strikes, and siege-like conditions have raised fears of a major humanitarian catastrophe. El Obeid, a critical transportation and aid hub linking central Sudan to Darfur, has become a focal point of the conflict as the RSF increases pressure on the SAF-held city, prompting warnings from the United Nations that up to 500,000 civilians could be at risk if a full-scale assault occurs. In recent weeks, repeated drone attacks have struck schools, fuel depots, water infrastructure, and civilian areas, killing and injuring civilians, disrupting essential services, and contributing to worsening shortages of food, fuel, and clean water. More than 11,000 people, including over 5,500 children, have reportedly fled the area, while UN investigators and human rights officials warn that the tactics being employed around El Obeid resemble those used before mass atrocities in El Fasher last year, leading to growing concern that another large-scale civilian tragedy could unfold unless hostilities are halted and humanitarian access is restored.
The fragile Saudi-Houthi ceasefire that had largely held since 2022 appears to have collapsed following a sharp escalation in hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi movement. The crisis was triggered by strikes on Sanaa International Airport, which the Houthis blamed on Saudi Arabia and its allies, prompting the group to launch missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia’s Abha International Airport—its first publicly claimed attack on Saudi territory in more than four years. Saudi forces reported intercepting the incoming projectiles, while the Houthis declared that the period of de-escalation had ended and warned airlines against using Saudi airspace. The renewed violence has raised fears that Yemen could be drawn back into a broader regional conflict, particularly given tensions involving Iran and disputes over flights between Tehran and Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Although the truce had never formally resolved the underlying political and military issues that fueled Yemen’s civil war, it had significantly reduced cross-border attacks and provided a measure of stability. The recent exchange of strikes, however, suggests that those gains are increasingly at risk, threatening renewed conflict along Saudi Arabia’s southern border and further instability in a region already affected by wider geopolitical tensions.
Israel’s declaration that it intends to maintain military forces in portions of southern Lebanon indefinitely has emerged as a major point of contention despite recent efforts to establish a broader framework for peace between Israel and Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated in early July that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would remain in self-described “security zones” in Lebanon without a fixed timetable for withdrawal, arguing that a continued military presence is necessary to protect Israeli communities and prevent a resurgence of Hezbollah activity. The announcement appears to contrast with the U.S.-brokered Israel-Lebanon framework agreement signed in June, which envisions a phased Israeli redeployment linked to the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and the restoration of Lebanese state authority throughout the country. Israeli leaders have maintained that any withdrawal will depend on concrete security guarantees and Hezbollah’s disarmament, while critics argue that an open-ended occupation risks undermining Lebanese sovereignty, destabilizing the fragile diplomatic process, and increasing the likelihood of renewed conflict along the border. As a result, the future of southern Lebanon has become a key test of whether recent diplomatic breakthroughs can translate into lasting security arrangements or whether competing interpretations of the peace framework will prolong military tensions in the region.
The European Commission’s new “Team Gaza Initiative,” which mobilizes nearly €900 million (about $1 billion) in recovery funding, represents a meaningful and much-needed contribution toward restoring basic services in Gaza, including water and sanitation networks, healthcare facilities, energy infrastructure, and debris removal efforts. However, while the package will provide important humanitarian and early-recovery support, it remains modest relative to the scale of Gaza’s destruction. The United Nations has estimated that full reconstruction of the territory could cost more than $70 billion, meaning the EU-led initiative represents only a small fraction of the resources ultimately required to rebuild homes, public infrastructure, economic activity, and essential institutions. As a result, the fund is best viewed as an important first step rather than a comprehensive reconstruction plan—a useful catalyst that could help stabilize conditions, restore critical services, and lay the groundwork for recovery, but one that remains a drop in the bucket compared with the immense long-term financial and logistical challenge of rebuilding Gaza.
Market Implications: The growing instability across the Middle East and Northeast Africa underscores the increasing fragility of several recent diplomatic initiatives and raises the risk of renewed regional conflict. Intensifying fighting around El Obeid in Sudan, coupled with mounting humanitarian concerns and limited international intervention, highlights the persistence of political and security risks across the Horn of Africa and could further disrupt regional trade routes, commodity flows, and investment activity. The apparent collapse of the Saudi-Houthi ceasefire reintroduces a significant geopolitical risk premium into Gulf markets, increasing concerns around aviation, shipping, and energy infrastructure security while supporting defense and security-related spending across the region. Meanwhile, Israel’s declaration that it intends to maintain an indefinite military presence in parts of southern Lebanon raises the prospect of prolonged border tensions and complicates efforts to achieve a durable regional stabilization framework, potentially sustaining elevated security risks for Lebanon and neighboring markets. Against this backdrop, the European Commission’s Gaza reconstruction initiative provides an important signal of international commitment to post-conflict recovery and may create opportunities for infrastructure, engineering, utilities, and humanitarian-support sectors, although the scale of funding currently pledged remains insufficient to materially alter the broader economic outlook. Taken together, these developments suggest a market environment characterized by elevated geopolitical uncertainty, favoring defense, security, and infrastructure-related sectors while weighing on tourism, transportation, and investment-sensitive industries that depend on regional stability.

Latin America & the Caribbean

Venezuela continues to grapple with the aftermath of the devastating twin earthquakes that struck the country’s north-central region on June 24, 2026, when magnitude 7.2 and 7.5 tremors, followed by more than 1,200 aftershocks, caused widespread destruction across several states, including La Guaira, Miranda, Carabobo, and the Capital District. Official reports indicate that more than 4,700 people have died, over 16,700 have been injured, and nearly 18,000 people have lost their homes, while damage to hospitals, transportation networks, communications infrastructure, and public utilities has severely disrupted essential services. The disaster’s economic impact is expected to be enormous, with UN estimates placing direct physical damage at approximately $37 billion and warning that broader economic losses could be substantially higher. Recovery efforts are now transitioning from search-and-rescue operations to longer-term humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, with the Venezuelan government, United Nations agencies, and international organizations expanding temporary shelter, healthcare, water and sanitation services, and emergency relief programs. To support these efforts, the UN has launched an additional $298 million emergency appeal targeting 1.3 million people in need, while international agencies continue to scale up aid deliveries and recovery planning. Despite these initiatives, the scale of the devastation and Venezuela’s preexisting economic and infrastructure challenges mean that recovery is expected to be a complex, multi-year undertaking.
Brazil’s expanding surveillance apparatus has become a notable feature of its national security and technology strategy, combining advanced government monitoring systems with a rapidly growing domestic artificial intelligence sector. A central component is the Brazilian Navy’s Blue Amazon Management System (SisGAAz), which is intended to provide persistent monitoring of the country’s vast maritime domain through networks of coastal radar, electro-optical sensors, infrared cameras, vessel-tracking systems, and autonomous monitoring stations. In July 2026, the Navy inaugurated its first operational coastal surveillance unit on Ilha Grande, designed to detect illegal fishing, smuggling, drug trafficking, and potential threats to critical infrastructure while contributing to real-time awareness across Brazil’s territorial waters. At the same time, Brazil has seen increased investment in AI-enabled surveillance technologies, with domestic startups and defense-technology firms developing data analytics, computer-vision, predictive-monitoring, and automated threat-detection tools that can be integrated into public-security, border-control, and maritime-surveillance systems. Supporters argue that these capabilities are necessary to protect Brazil’s 7,400-kilometer coastline, offshore energy infrastructure, and maritime trade routes, while critics warn that the growing convergence of state surveillance systems, AI-powered monitoring, and large-scale data collection raises important questions regarding transparency, accountability, privacy rights, and the potential expansion of government monitoring powers.
Cuba’s electricity crisis has deepened significantly in recent months, with repeated nationwide grid failures and increasingly prolonged blackouts disrupting daily life, healthcare, transportation, and economic activity across the island. Since January 2026, tighter U.S. measures targeting Cuba’s fuel supply—including restrictions that have sharply reduced oil shipments to the country—have exacerbated chronic fuel shortages in a system already burdened by aging power plants and deteriorating infrastructure. Cuba experienced multiple nationwide blackouts in July alone, leaving millions without power and forcing authorities to rely on emergency “micro-grid” systems to keep hospitals and other essential services functioning. Cuban officials argue that U.S. sanctions and what they describe as an energy blockade have deprived the island of critical fuel imports and pushed the electrical system to the brink of collapse, while U.S. officials contend that decades of underinvestment and government mismanagement are the primary causes of the crisis. Regardless of the competing narratives, the result has been more frequent outages, growing public frustration, shortages of water and basic services, and increasing concern that Cuba’s humanitarian and economic challenges will continue to worsen unless a more stable source of fuel and investment can be secured.
President-elect Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory marks one of the most significant political shifts in modern Colombian politics, ending the left-leaning Petro era and signaling a return to a more conservative, security-focused, and pro-business agenda. Campaigning on promises of deregulation, fiscal austerity, tougher action against armed groups and drug-trafficking organizations, and a closer strategic relationship with the United States, de la Espriella has pledged to reverse many of the previous administration’s domestic and foreign-policy priorities. His election is expected to strengthen U.S.-Colombia security cooperation, encourage foreign investment, and align Colombia more closely with the growing bloc of right-leaning governments in the Americas, while also increasing pressure on guerrilla groups, FARC dissidents, the ELN, and transnational criminal networks. At the same time, critics warn that his hardline approach to security, plans to scale back state institutions, and proposals to dismantle parts of Colombia’s peace architecture could heighten political polarization and complicate efforts to negotiate with armed groups. Beyond Colombia, his presidency is widely viewed as part of a broader rightward shift in Latin America, potentially reshaping regional diplomacy, strengthening ties with Washington and Israel, and altering the balance of power in debates over security, migration, drug policy, and economic integration across the hemisphere.
Market Implications: Recent developments across Latin America highlight a growing divergence between countries facing acute humanitarian and infrastructure challenges and those pursuing more market-oriented security and investment agendas. Venezuela’s devastating earthquakes have created a massive reconstruction burden that is likely to strain already fragile public finances, disrupt economic activity for years, and increase reliance on international aid, while creating potential opportunities in infrastructure rebuilding, construction materials, and humanitarian logistics. In Brazil, expanding investments in maritime surveillance, coastal security, and AI-enabled monitoring systems reinforce the country’s focus on protecting critical infrastructure, energy assets, and trade routes, supporting domestic defense, technology, and security-related industries while raising longer-term governance and regulatory questions around data use and surveillance. Cuba’s worsening electricity crisis and recurring blackouts continue to weaken economic output, tourism, and industrial activity, underscoring the economic costs of chronic underinvestment and energy insecurity while increasing the risk of further social instability. Meanwhile, Colombia’s political shift under President-elect Abelardo de la Espriella is being viewed positively by many investors, with expectations of a more business-friendly regulatory environment, stronger security cooperation with the United States, and increased support for private investment, although a tougher stance toward armed groups could generate periods of political and security-related volatility. Taken together, these developments point to a regional environment where infrastructure, security, technology, and reconstruction-related sectors may outperform, while economies facing energy shortages, fiscal constraints, or humanitarian crises continue to pose elevated political and economic risks.

Asia & Pacific (ex-China/India/Japan)

More than 500 people are feared dead after two boats carrying mostly Rohingya refugees capsized off Myanmar’s coast, according to a joint statement from the International Organization for Migration and the UN Refugee Agency. Both vessels departed Rakhine state in late June, outside the regular sailing season; one carrying roughly 250 people lost contact shortly after departure, while a second carrying about 280 people is believed to have sunk off the Ayeyarwady coast on July 8. UNHCR spokesperson Matthew Saltmarsh said the tragedy fits a worsening pattern, with nearly 300 people already reported dead or missing in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal so far this year, following a 2025 toll of roughly 900 deaths, the deadliest year on record for the route. The agencies linked the rising toll to Myanmar’s civil war, now in its sixth year since the 2021 military coup, escalating conflict in Rakhine between the junta and the Arakan Army, and funding cuts that have strained conditions in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar camps, home to roughly one million Rohingya. The UN bodies called for stronger regional search-and-rescue cooperation, expanded access to asylum, and action against smuggling networks along what they described as one of the world’s deadliest migration routes.
South Korea’s Supreme Court upheld a seven-year prison sentence against ousted President Yoon Suk Yeol for obstruction of justice, marking the first of his eight pending trials to reach the country’s highest court since his removal from office. The court found no legal error in the lower court’s ruling that Yoon had ordered presidential bodyguards to block investigators from executing a detention warrant in January 2025, following his brief martial law declaration in December 2024 that triggered South Korea’s worst political crisis in decades. The ruling also covered charges including abuse of power and falsifying documents, though the court set aside one charge tied to a false martial law proclamation. Yoon’s legal team said it would challenge the ruling’s constitutionality. Separately, a Seoul court sentenced Yoon to two years in prison on July 13 for illegally accepting manipulated opinion polls from political broker Myung Tae-kyun ahead of his 2022 presidential bid, a case distinct from his ongoing appeal of a February life sentence on the more serious insurrection charge stemming from the martial law episode.
Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s 400 billion baht ($12 billion) emergency loan decree, financing a consumer subsidy scheme and clean-energy transition, was constitutional, rejecting an opposition challenge that argued the borrowing lacked sufficient urgency to bypass the standard budget process. The ruling lifts uncertainty over state spending just as Anutin’s four-month-old government faces mounting political pressure, with a recent Nida poll placing him behind People’s Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut. That decline has been driven largely by a corruption scandal involving recruitment exams at the Department of Local Administration, in which investigators believe officials collected bribes of 350,000 to 800,000 baht per applicant, potentially totaling 4.5 billion baht across more than 430,000 candidates. The ruling Bhumjaithai Party also faces allegations of rigging the senatorial election through ties to a bloc of “blue senators,” a case that could trigger party dissolution if upheld, along with a separate petition arguing that barcodes on ballot papers compromise voter secrecy, a ruling that could disqualify all 500 sitting MPs. Analysts cited in the Bangkok Post suggest Bhumjaithai’s survival depends less on these scandals than on whether Thailand’s “deep state” continues to view the party as useful, noting a recent public appearance by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto as a signal he remains politically relevant.
Bangladesh plans to construct approximately 108 kilometers of fencing along vulnerable stretches of its 271-kilometer border with Myanmar, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed announced last month, marking the first such infrastructure Dhaka has built along any of its borders. The project responds to a security vacuum created since December 2024, when the Arakan Army, an ethnic rebel group, completed its capture of Maungdaw and assumed de facto control over Rakhine State’s border areas, leaving the central Myanmar junta with what a Bangladesh Coast Guard official called zero command or administrative authority along the frontier. Since the Arakan Army’s takeover, Border Guard Bangladesh records show more than 426 Bangladeshi fishermen have been detained from the Naf River and Bay of Bengal, with 324 repatriated so far, amid reports the group abducts civilians for ransom to help fund its operations. Officials cite additional drivers, including a rise in drug and arms trafficking, recruitment of Bangladeshi nationals from the Chittagong Hill Tracts into the Arakan Army, and risks from landmines and unexploded ordnance near the border. The plan also carries symbolic weight, signaling Bangladesh’s position that it will not indefinitely absorb the costs of instability originating in Myanmar as it separately manages roughly 1.2 million Rohingya refugees, many displaced since 2017, whose prospects for repatriation face new uncertainty given the Arakan Army’s documented hostility toward the Rohingya population.
Market Implications: Recent developments across Southeast Asia highlight the growing economic and security costs of political instability and unresolved regional conflicts. The Rohingya refugee tragedy and deteriorating conditions in Myanmar underscore the continuing humanitarian fallout from the country’s civil war, increasing pressure on neighboring states, straining regional migration systems, and creating ongoing risks for trade, investment, and cross-border economic activity connected to Myanmar. Bangladesh’s decision to construct border fencing reflects a broader shift toward security-focused policies designed to contain the spillover effects of instability, while also signaling reduced expectations for a near-term resolution of the Rohingya crisis. In South Korea, the Supreme Court’s ruling against former President Yoon Suk Yeol removes some legal uncertainty surrounding a major political controversy, reinforcing institutional stability despite the lingering impact of multiple ongoing legal cases. Meanwhile, Thailand’s political environment remains clouded by corruption investigations and legal challenges facing the governing coalition, creating an overhang for investor sentiment even as the Constitutional Court’s approval of the government’s large fiscal stimulus program supports infrastructure, clean-energy investment, and consumer spending. Taken together, these developments suggest a mixed regional outlook: South Korea remains supported by strong institutional resilience, Thailand may benefit from continued fiscal support despite elevated political risk, while Myanmar and its neighbors face persistent security and humanitarian challenges that continue to weigh on long-term economic integration and investment confidence.

Sub-Saharan Africa

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Ebola outbreak, caused by the Bundibugyo strain for which no vaccine or treatment exists, has surpassed 2,000 confirmed cases and 750 deaths as the World Health Organization calls it the third-largest and fastest-growing outbreak on record; WHO officials said the outbreak reached 1,000 cases within 40 days, compared with 235 days for the 2018 North Kivu outbreak, and that roughly 80% of new infections trace to unknown chains of transmission. WHO’s Dr. Chikwe Ihekweazu warned the actual scale could be two to four times the reported figures, noting the virus has spread beyond Ituri province, the epicenter accounting for up to 95% of cases, into Haut-Uele and Tshopo. Compounding the response, healthcare workers in Ituri, including epidemiologists and grave diggers, went on strike this week over unpaid wages, first at Rwampara General Hospital and then at Bunia General Hospital, where workers blocked the entrance. The US CDC has implemented entry screening and a 30-day suspension on entry from affected countries, though it assesses the risk to Americans as low, and a clinical trial testing an antiviral drug for post-exposure prevention launched this week. WHO has tied the outbreak’s persistence to weak health infrastructure, ongoing regional conflict complicating contact tracing, and distrust of the government fueling misinformation and attacks on health workers.
Nigeria’s military has secured the release of all 44 students and teachers abducted on May 15 from three schools in Osiire district, Oyo state, ending a 56-day ordeal that drew intense national attention, in part because such large-scale school kidnappings have historically been concentrated in Nigeria’s north. President Bola Tinubu said security forces arrested eight of the assailants and killed an unspecified number during the operation, which the army said involved coordination among the military, police, intelligence agencies, and local vigilante groups, and included dismantling informant networks and hideouts in the Old Oyo National Park forest. Several soldiers died during the month-long rescue mission, according to the army. Defence Minister Christopher Musa said the kidnappers had intended to use the hostages as leverage to press the government into releasing imprisoned commanders, though presidential spokesperson Bayo Onanuga said no concessions were made in securing the release. The freed captives, whose ages reportedly ranged from two to 18, are receiving medical treatment before returning home. The episode underscores the persistence of ransom-driven school kidnappings across Nigeria, a problem the SBM Intelligence research firm estimates generated more than $1.6 million in ransom payments in 2024 alone. It has also renewed scrutiny of the government’s long-stalled Safe School Initiative, with Oyo teachers’ union leader Hassan Ajibola calling for fuller implementation of measures such as CCTV, fencing, and regular security patrols ahead of Nigeria’s general election next year.
Security forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo used excessive force and failed to protect protesters from a ruling-party-linked assault during a June 12 demonstration against a bill that could open the door to a third term for President Félix Tshisekedi. The bill would allow a referendum resetting the clock on Tshisekedi’s prior terms, working around a constitutional bar on term-limit revisions by invoking a “major dysfunction” clause; it passed the Senate and National Assembly without opposition lawmakers present, and Tshisekedi, 62, has since referred it to the constitutional court for review. Police used tear gas and batons against protesters from the opposition coalition C64, while members of Force of Progress, a group linked to the ruling UDPS party, attacked opposition offices and joined security forces in assaulting demonstrators, including at the ECiDé party headquarters where injured protesters had taken shelter. Interviewed Force of Progress members said UDPS officials had paid them to disrupt the protest, an allegation the party denies, and more than a dozen protesters were injured, including opposition leaders Martin Fayulu, Delly Sesanga, Jean-Marc Kabund, and Ados Ndombasi, with authorities opening an investigation while also detaining several dozen demonstrators. The C64 coalition postponed planned July protests after an African Union mediation offer but has since rescheduled demonstrations for July 22, with critics including Nobel laureate Denis Mukwege and the Catholic Church arguing that constitutional constraints bar amendments during the country’s declared Ebola emergency and ongoing conflict with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels.
Remnants of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group, numbering up to 500 fighters, have built a drug empire along the Central African Republic’s upper Oubangui River centered on tramadol, an opioid painkiller that becomes a potent stimulant at high doses. Miners, pro-Russian demonstrators, and fighters facing combat all use the drug, with tablets of 200 milligrams or more, well above the standard dose, distributed to suppress fear and boost aggression before battle. The trade has given Wagner fresh momentum since founder Yevgeny Prigozhin’s 2023 death, and the group, now led locally by his son Pavel, earns an estimated $180 million a year from illicit gold exports alongside tramadol profits that fund weapons and militias intimidating opposition supporters in Bangui. A June 2026 report from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime found Wagner-linked actors embedded across the country’s ministries and security services, running a fuel monopoly and laundering gold through UAE-linked exporters, with exports rising from 1.7 to as much as seven metric tons between 2023 and late 2025. Violence tied to the group has intensified, including a February 2025 massacre of roughly 130 Fulani pastoralists, and researchers warn Wagner is now coordinating with Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces to expand into Darfur.
Market Implications: Developments across Central and Sub-Saharan Africa highlight the growing intersection of public health, political instability, and security risks. The rapidly expanding Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, compounded by healthcare worker strikes, weak state capacity, and ongoing conflict, raises the risk of prolonged economic disruption, reduced investor confidence, and increased pressure on already fragile healthcare and public-service systems. At the same time, President Tshisekedi’s push to amend constitutional term limits and the violent suppression of opposition protests have heightened political risk in one of the world’s most important producers of critical minerals, creating potential concerns for mining operations, supply chains, and foreign investment should unrest escalate further. In Nigeria, the successful rescue of kidnapped students provides a positive signal regarding state security capabilities, but the persistence of ransom-driven kidnappings continues to highlight broader governance and security challenges that weigh on long-term business confidence and infrastructure development. Meanwhile, reports that Wagner-linked networks are expanding their influence in the Central African Republic through illicit gold exports, narcotics trafficking, and political intimidation underscore the growing role of non-state actors in regional economies, increasing reputational, governance, and sanctions-related risks for businesses operating in conflict-affected areas. Taken together, these developments reinforce a cautious outlook for the region, with critical minerals, security services, and humanitarian support remaining key areas of focus, while political instability, health emergencies, and armed conflict continue to elevate operational and investment risks.

Top News This Month

Middle East & North Africa

Latin America & the Caribbean

Asia & Pacific (ex-China/India/Japan)

Sub-Saharan Africa

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