This week in Geopolitical Concerns, we examine the “reverse Kissinger” strategy of the present U.S. administration as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin deepen their Eurasian partnership, alongside Russia’s militarization and the urgent need for Europe to boost its defense and support for Ukraine. In Geoeconomics, we unpack the U.S.-China tariff rollback, the politics of dollar weakening, and the global resurgence of industrial policy—trends reshaping how states wield economic power. Global Junctions explores the AI identity crisis of Silicon Valley’s tech giants, the growing influence of technopolar actors like Elon Musk, and the fragile status of the U.S. judiciary as a bulwark against rising authoritarianism. In Global Trajectories, we track the regional upheaval following Syria’s regime collapse, the deepening fragmentation of Sudan, and looming famine in Gaza, all amid faltering global crisis response mechanisms. Finally, in a special section, Remembering Joseph Nye, Jr., we reflect on the enduring influence of the “soft power” pioneer—his intellectual and policy legacy, his final warnings on nuclear proliferation, and his lasting belief in the moral purpose of American power.
Geopolitical Concerns
A ‘Reverse Kissinger’? Not While Xi and Putin Are Around
Hal Brands, Bloomberg
Xi Jinping has Vladimir Putin over a barrel
The Economist
Brace for disorder as the great power shifts begin
Timothy Garton Ash, The Financial Times
What Putin wants—and how Europe should thwart him
The Economist
As Russia celebrated the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War last week, mounting evidence suggests that the U.S.-led international order, once dominant, is giving way to a prolonged era of global disorder. This is underscored by multiple ongoing wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan, and escalating trade tensions between major economies. Amid this upheaval, President Donald Trump’s administration has envisioned a “reverse Kissinger” strategy—detaching Russia from China as Kissinger once split China from the USSR. Yet this goal remains elusive as Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin showcased their alliance in Moscow on May 9th, during Russia’s Victory Day Parade, reaffirming their partnership and downplaying Western efforts to divide them. Behind the spectacle lies deepening Russian dependency on China, visible along their 4,300km border and in their economic ties: trade rose 66% from 2021 to 2024, hitting $245bn, with Russia exporting mostly energy. China now makes up 34% of Russia’s trade, but Russia only 4% of China’s, a stark imbalance fueled by Western sanctions. China gains leverage—demanding discounts on oil and delaying gas deals—while using the yuan in bilateral trade. Chinese investment remains limited ($18bn), especially compared to the EU’s pre-war €311bn, prompting some to call the relationship “more colonial” than cooperative.
Furthermore, Putin’s war in Ukraine has evolved into a broader confrontation with the West, reflected in a shift in Russian public sentiment—55% now prioritize global respect over living standards. War mobilization is reshaping the economy, with soldier pay and defense industries propping up employment and spending 1.5% of GDP. Though Russia has suffered nearly 1 million casualties in Ukraine and secured few territorial gains, its military remains potent, expanding personnel to 1.5 million and fortifying its western front. Direct invasions may be unlikely soon, but Putin could test NATO’s resolve through hybrid tactics or by seizing minor territory to provoke a crisis. To counter this, the West must deny him victory in Ukraine. Europe, in particular, must boost arms and financial support for Ukraine—whose defense industry could produce $35bn annually but lacks orders—and also invest more in its own security, given the uncertainty of U.S. commitment. NATO (excluding the U.S.) increased defense spending by 19% in 2022–23, but more is needed. Europe must unify around a long-term Russia strategy, maintain alliance cohesion despite varied threat perceptions, and engage constructively with Russians beyond the regime. With its economic and industrial capacity, Europe can both resist Putin’s ambitions and lay the groundwork for future reconciliation.
Geoeconomics
America has given China a strangely good tariff deal
The Economist
A great trade victory over America is being celebrated in China
The Economist
Trump’s Misguided Plan to Weaken the Dollar by Kenneth Rogoff
Kenneth Rogoff, Project Syndicate
Welcome to the new age of geoeconomics
Gillian Tett, The Financial Times
Following weekend talks in Geneva, a surprisingly favorable trade deal was announced on May 12th, 2025, with the United States agreeing to reduce “reciprocal” tariffs on China from 145% to 30% for at least 90 days, while China has agreed to a similar reduction. This followed President Trump’s April 2nd tariff hike of 34%, which quickly escalated to 84% and 145%, creating an unwanted near-embargo. China’s trade envoy Li Chenggang framed the deal with the saying “Good food is never too late,” as Beijing also lifted its ban on Boeing jets and hinted at easing rare-earth export curbs. Chinese media hailed the agreement as a “great victory” and proof that America had “blinked” under pressure from falling markets and public frustration. While state outlet Xinhua was measured, nationalist voices like Hu Xijin were jubilant. On WeChat, users called the U.S. a “paper tiger,” emboldened by praise from the global south as Xi Jinping met Latin American leaders on May 13th. Banks like Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan raised China’s 2025 growth forecasts to 4.6%-4.8%, as April’s 21% export drop to the U.S. was expected to stabilize. Markets responded positively on May 12th, with the S&P 500 up 2.6% and the Hang Seng up 1.7%, though the latter dipped 2% the next day. Despite the optimism, Chinese officials feared Trump could reverse course, prompting exporters to rush shipments during the 90-day window.
The deal reflects a broader geoeconomic shift where states increasingly use economic policy for power projection, diverging from the neoliberal era. This change is not solely Trump-driven but structural, with countries prioritizing relative global position over domestic welfare. It aligns with proposals like the “Mar-a-Lago Accord,” promoted by Stephen Miran, Chair of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, which seeks to weaken the dollar. Miran argues that the dollar’s reserve status inflates its value, undermines exports, and drives offshoring. Critics counter that this overlooks key facts: reserve demand centers on Treasuries, not all U.S. assets; nations can sell existing foreign holdings; and reserve currency issuers like the U.S. (1960s–70s) or UK (1800s–1914) have run current-account surpluses. They also point to the 2024 U.S. fiscal deficit of 6.4% of GDP, larger than the current-account deficit (under 4%), suggesting fiscal policy—not the dollar—is a stronger deficit driver. Automation and U.S. economic strength also shape trade dynamics. As such, Miran’s case is seen as a “flawed diagnosis,” making tariffs a questionale remedy. Still, the trend is global: the ECB is developing a digital euro, Saudi Arabia is building a national tech stack, Japan is leveraging Treasury holdings, and industrial policy is resurging.
Global Junctions
The Last Bulwark | Noah Feldman | The New York Review of Books
Noah Feldman, The New York Review of Books
Ian Bremmer: The Frightening Fusion of Tech Power and State Power
Ian Bremmer, Foreign Affairs
The Giants of Silicon Valley Are Having a Midlife Crisis Over AI
Tim Higgins, The Wall Street Journal
As of May 2025, major tech giants like Apple, Google, Meta (Facebook), and Tesla are grappling with a midlife crisis over artificial intelligence, embodying the “innovator’s dilemma” described by Clayton Christensen. Apple’s CEO Tim Cook has urged patience amid delays in AI feature rollouts, while Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg promotes AI as a social companion. Tesla’s Elon Musk reassures investors despite declining stock prices, and Google CEO Sundar Pichai faced a 7% stock drop following reports of decreased Safari search traffic, even as Google launched its controversial Gemini AI assistant. Amid this uncertainty, venture capitalist Sarah Guo highlights emerging opportunities for startups, while Microsoft and Nvidia continue to profit from the AI boom. Adding to the complexity, newer challengers like China’s DeepSeek intensify competition, echoing the turbulence of the dot-com era. Meanwhile, the rise of a “technopolar world” is reshaping global power dynamics, with tech CEOs like Elon Musk exercising influence over geopolitical affairs—exemplified by Musk’s refusal to deploy Starlink in a Ukrainian military operation—challenging traditional nation-state authority. Despite regulatory pushback in the U.S. and China, these firms maintain deep control over digital infrastructure, creating a fragile hybrid order between states and tech corporations and raising critical questions about democracy and sovereignty.
At the same time, the Trump administration’s ongoing challenges to constitutional boundaries have thrust the judiciary into the spotlight as the primary defender of the rule of law. Since 2017, incidents such as the March 15, 2024 deportation of 238 Venezuelans in defiance of Judge James Boasberg’s order, Vice President J.D. Vance’s public dismissals of judicial authority, and Trump’s call to remove Boasberg have tested the courts’ resilience. The Supreme Court, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett occasionally siding with liberal justices, has largely resisted executive overreach amid a weakening Congress and ineffective impeachment processes. Despite controversies surrounding rulings like Dobbs, the Court’s refusal to endorse Trump’s efforts to overturn electoral outcomes underscores its critical institutional role. Experts warn that undermining the Court’s legitimacy risks dismantling the final safeguard against authoritarianism, highlighting the fragility of American constitutional democracy even as tech firms reshape global power.
Global Trajectories
In Private, Some Israeli Officers Admit That Gaza Is on the Brink of Starvation
Natan Odenheimer and Ronen Bergman, The New York Times
The collapse of Sudan: A global threat
Le Monde
David Makovsky and Simone Saidmehr, Foreign Affairs
The unexpected overthrow in Syria of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 by a rebel coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under Ahmed al-Shara ended five decades of Assad family rule after a brutal 13-year civil war. Turkey, dominant in northwest Syria since 2019, backs HTS and manages a buffer zone to contain Kurdish autonomy and the refugee crisis, while Israel has seized southern buffer zones near the Golan Heights to curb Turkish military expansion and Islamist influence. Israeli leadership, divided over engagement with Shara’s Islamist regime, balances a strong military presence with cautious diplomacy toward Turkey, a complicated U.S. ally, as Israel seeks to prevent further regional destabilization amid declining Iranian influence and U.S. troop withdrawals.
In Sudan, the three-year civil war continues to devastate the country, with over 150,000 dead and more than 13 million displaced. Port Sudan, once a key aid hub, has been hit by repeated drone strikes since May 2025, complicating humanitarian relief amid ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who declared their own government in April, raising fears of Sudan’s fragmentation. Foreign involvement from the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia intensifies the conflict, prompting UN calls for international pressure, especially on the U.S., as President Donald Trump prepares a regional visit. Meanwhile, Israeli military officials have privately warned of an imminent starvation crisis in Gaza due to a blockade on food and fuel since March 2025. Despite these warnings and mounting international condemnation, including a near-unanimous UN Security Council call to lift the blockade, Prime Minister Netanyahu remains committed to expanding operations against Hamas, even as the Trump administration collaborates with Israel on a controversial aid distribution plan rejected by humanitarian groups for risking civilian safety. Experts warn that knowingly causing starvation could constitute a war crime, underscoring the urgent humanitarian crisis amid the region’s complex conflicts.
Remembering Joseph Nye, Jr.
The Atlantic Council
Will We See More Nuclear Proliferation? by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Joseph Nye, Jr., Project Syndicate
Joseph S. Nye Jr., a renowned public servant and scholar who passed away on May 6, leaves a lasting legacy—most notably for coining “soft power”, the idea that nations like the United States can influence others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion. This concept reshaped how international relations are understood. Nye uniquely combined academic rigor with government service, holding senior roles at the Pentagon, the State Department, and as chair of the National Intelligence Council, while teaching at Harvard. He was also active with the Atlantic Council, serving on its board from 2014 until his death and participating in its December 2024 Strategy Consortium. Known for his intellect, clarity, and graciousness, Nye remained a “guarded optimist” about the U.S., believing in its capacity for reinvention. His enduring policy influence rested on his conviction that the US-led, post-WWII international order promoted global prosperity and peace, and that American power should serve moral purpose.
In a final article published on May 1, Nye warned that nuclear stability—maintained for over 80 years—is increasingly at risk. He argued that the Trump administration’s weakening of alliances undermines America’s extended deterrence, potentially encouraging more nations to pursue nuclear weapons. While crediting the NPT and organizations like the IAEA with curbing proliferation, Nye pointed to serious challenges, including Iran enriching uranium above 60%, which IAEA chief Rafael Grossi warned could enable bomb production within months. He rejected the view that more nuclear states might enhance stability, calling such assumptions flawed and dangerous. Nye cautioned that early nuclear acquisition could heighten insecurity and that even a single tactical strike would break a long-standing global taboo. He also emphasized the threat of nonstate actors acquiring weapons-usable material. His conclusion was stark: global nonproliferation is vital, as proliferation threatens all states—including the most powerful. The future, he believed, hinges on the strength of US alliances and deterrence.
