The power struggle between the US and China is shifting alliances, defining foreign policy objectives, and disrupting the liberal international order. Recent US actions, like the AUKUS deal, have made it clear that the US is pivoting its foreign policy to the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s rise. As the US forges new alliances in the Pacific, what effect will this pivot have on America’s relationship with long-standing European allies? Will Europe step up its defense capabilities to create a more robust, strategic transatlantic alliance or will it continue to be muddled in European politics?

US-China Great Power Struggle Drifting Towards Conflict

A US-China Clash is Not Unthinkable

Edward Luce, Financial Times

China is a Declining Power – and That’s the Problem

Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Foreign Policy

The struggle for supremacy between the United States and China is likely to be one of the defining characteristics of the 2020’s.  Many have drawn parallels to the great power struggles of the past: the US and the USSR, Great Britain and Germany, Sparta and Athens.  This last conflict, documented by the classical historian Thucydides, gave rise to the term “Thucydides Trap” in describing the seemingly inexorable pull towards war in superpower rivalry.  Many believe the jaws of the trap will soon close, sprung by some misstep from one of the sides, possibly related to Taiwanese independence.  As we have written previously, in twelve of the previous sixteen cases where a major power threatens a ruling power, the end result is war.  However, the underlying reason for these wars requires a rethinking of the Thucydidean axiom.  The traditional interpretation pits a restless, upstart state against an aging and well-established power, wherein the revisionist state attempts to supplant the existing world order with its own.  In actuality, the catalyst for violence is often a weakening (rather than a strengthening) of the aspirational power’s position, galvanizing swift and risky action in order to act while the state is still at the peak of its power.  If the state could continue to consolidate power by nonviolent means, it would; it is precisely because the state believes these engines of growth to be exhausted that it undertakes the dangerous game of military expansion.  The story of early-1900’s Germany and 1920’s Japan is playing out again in China: after decades of astronomical growth, China’s economic engine has stalled with its natural resources severely depleted and its population rapidly aging, while foreign adversaries (threatened by China’s increasingly hostile demeanor) have closed ranks to contain its influence.  With old methods of growth ineffective, China has sought new and riskier alternatives to achieve its goals before the window of opportunity closes completely.  The inevitable unpredictability of such a mindset makes the United States’ task that much more difficult.  If the US wants to maintain its prominent position, it must continue pursuing long-term competitive goals with China while staving off aggressive short-term moves from the CCP.  How effective it is in doing so will shape the course of history.

German Voters Punish Merkel’s Party in an Election Without a Clear Victor

Melannie Amann et. al., Spiegel International

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In Germany’s general election on Sunday the Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by Olaf Schulz, edged out over Armin Laschet’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) which received its lowest share of the vote ever in postwar Germany. Though the SPD garnered the most votes, it was not enough to make them the clear victor. As expected, Germany’s election this past weekend resulted in a political stalemate, setting the stage for weeks or even months of coalition talks. Olaf Scholz claimed victory on Sunday night for the SPD, but the CDU is not quite out of the running, despite its rapid fall over the last couple of months. With just 1.6% of the vote less than the SPD, Armin Laschet also claimed the right to build the country’s next governing coalition. The true power now lies in the hands of the Green Party and the Free Democrats which will be the “kingmakers” of the next government. Both parties are members of the two most likely coalitions: a group made up of the Union, Greens, and FDP or the trio of the SPD, Greens, and FDP. Three party coalitions will likely be the result of many future German governments. Many analysts and political scientists say this type of system better reflects society which has become more pluralized and individualized. At the same time, the search for compromise will become even more difficult. While the makeup of Germany’s next government is unclear, one thing seems to be for sure: the era of big-tent parties and two-party coalitions is over.

The AUKUS Deal and A New World Order

Joe Biden’s New World Order

Tom McTague, The Atlantic

The AUKUS Dominoes Are Just Starting to Fall

Stephen M. Walt and Renée Belfer, Foreign Policy

The “AUKUS” military coalition between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States has demonstrated the US’s commitment to countering China through geostrategic as well as economic avenues.  While the Middle Kingdom was notably absent from President Biden’s speech announcing the partnership, his vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” was a clear overtone against China’s increasingly expansionist policy in the South China Sea.  The partnership also breaks from former president Donald Trump’s “America Alone” policy, though the catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan has many concerned about entering a new defense venture.  Still, such moves present the possibility that the liberal international order may be at an inflection point, pivoting away from a complacent status quo to a more dynamic mode of institutional leadership.  The Anglo alliance is a first step towards a grand strategy designed to counter Chinese ambitions.

China has itself to blame for pushing Australia into an alliance with Western allies. Until China imposed a punishing trade embargo on Australia in response to its proposal for an independent investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, Canberra was relatively agnostic to China’s rise. Prior to the trade embargo, opposing the growth of China was, arguably, not in Australia’s interest as it hoped to preserve valuable commercial ties. Australian attitudes towards China have since hardened, making it a perfect ally for the US in the region. The AUKUS deal may also signal a shift in Australia’s nuclear policy. The country has been a strong opponent of nuclear proliferation for years, but this new deal, which includes the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology reliant on highly enriched uranium, is a step in the direction of more extensive nuclear infrastructure. The issue of nuclear deterrence has become a greater concern in the region as China expands its nuclear arsenal. If China continues down this road, US and Australian opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities may soften.

European defence: the quest for ‘strategic autonomy’

Henry Foy and Sam Fleming, Financial Times

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The Australia-UK-US defense deal, dubbed “AUKUS”, announced less than two weeks ago sent France into a fit of outrage as it was cut out of a $66 billion submarine contract with Australia. While President Biden has taken steps to calm French President Emmanual Macron’s anger over the deal, reminding France that a ruptured relationship with Washington would be a greater loss than one military contract, the AUKUS defense agreement highlights the need for more military cooperation between European Union (EU) states. The Biden administration is pivoting US foreign policy towards competition with China. While European allies remain of great importance to the Biden administration, European security matters are a lesser priority than bolstering relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. This realization among EU leaders has re-ignited the debate about a collective EU defense strategy. The European defense strategy has centered on achieving “strategic autonomy”, but nobody can seem to agree on what this actually means. For some member states, this means breaking from NATO and creating a European military force, but for others, it means stepping up defense contributions to be more “on par” with Americans. Regardless, even with more robust and effective defense collaboration, the EU will be unable to replace its partnership with the US; “Paris and its EU partners have been forced to reckon with a broader conclusion: that while the US is becoming less focused on European defence, it remains the indispensable partner for EU states.” The transatlantic alliance remains paramount to both European and global security, so the issue is not about how Europe can become militarily independent from the US, but how it can become a “more reliable, and muscular ally.”