For this week’s geopolitical look, we begin with a discussion of the self-destructive nature of Putin’s war in Ukraine. From there, we examine how CIA Director Bill Burns has distinguished himself and his organization during the Ukrainian conflict through masterful intelligence strategies. Finally, we examine how the US’s potentially outdated perception of the Middle East is hampering real progress in the region. These all show the importance of ideology in driving real events – be it Putin’s revanchist obsession with “Kyivian Rus,” an intelligence officer’s weaponization of intelligence, an ambivalent foreign policy, or an outdated impression of Middle Eastern politics. When an ideology does not correspond to reality, the friction between the two may cause fires.

Energy and Nationalism are Fueling Putin’s War

Russia Is Finished as a Major Energy Power

Simon Johnson and Oleg Ustenko, Project Syndicate 

Putin’s War Will Destroy Russia

Nina L. Khrushcheva, Project Syndicate 

Russia’s fossil fuel exports have undoubtedly enabled its invasion of Ukraine, but in so doing President Putin may be eroding the very leverage he used to invade. The moral condemnation of Putin’s actions (atrocities widely considered to be war crimes) has led many European nations to accelerate plans for energy independence from Russia. Already, several nations have cut imports, even imposing gas rations in some areas to prevent economic dependence on Russia. Others have considered paying for imports into frozen Russian accounts, preventing the profits from funding Putin’s war effort. While Russia may pivot to Asia to slough off its excess supply, insurers will be hesitant to insure tankers carrying Russian energy, which may lead shipping corporations to sever ties with the Kremlin and leave Russia’s exports without ships to carry them. But even if that was not a problem there is a myriad of logistical nightmares regarding funneling Russia’s energy into China and other Asian destinations. Even with these actual and potential costs, though, Putin has been reluctant to withdraw from Ukraine, for he sees Kyiv as the center of his pan-Slavic vision, and the epicenter of changing the balance of power. This radical nationalist ideology seems to have gone unnoticed by many of Russia’s officials, who seemed as surprised as the West when Putin invaded. Now that he has invaded, Putin’s war will likely end in one of four ways. If Russia succeeds in seizing control of Ukraine, it will still have a long and hard battle ahead to maintain its control of the territory, as was the case in Afghanistan in the 1980s. On the other hand, Ukraine may cede Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, allowing the Kremlin’s propaganda machine to run rampant with Putin’s narrative despite Russia’s status as a global pariah. If the conflict stagnates, a third scenario might involve the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, an escalatory scenario that Putin will only fall back on if he feels cornered. But the Russian President may be removed from power before he has an opportunity to push the button. Even in this last scenario, the kleptocracy built around Putin might remain in place, exercising authoritarian control over the Russian people. Whatever the outcome, Putin has given the wheel of history a hard turn; righting the ship will be no easy task, in Russia or the geopolitical order.

Bill Burns and the Bear

The Economist

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CIA director William Burns is a former career diplomat who has served five presidents and has had two postings in Moscow, making him an invaluable leader in the Ukrainian crisis. After American and British spies discovered Russia’s war planning last October, Burns was sent to Moscow to warn Putin of the consequences that would follow should he start a war with Ukraine. Following this meeting with Putin, Burns successfully convinced European allies of Russia’s plans by making the American and British intelligence on them public. Burns’ efforts have been “hailed as one of the most creative and successful uses of intelligence in many years.” This Economist article highlights three qualities of Burns’ leadership that have made him a critical figure in America’s handling of the Ukrainian crisis. First of all, Burns has a deep knowledge of Russia stemming from his deep appreciation and understanding of it which he garnered during his years as ambassador. “There is simply no one who knows Russia better,” says National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. Furthermore, his knowledge of US foreign policy and recognition that the US is no longer the world’s policeman has been critical not only in the Ukrainian crisis but also in the CIA’s overall strategy building. Second, Burns’ institutionalism has been vital in repurposing and reassuring the CIA after the many blunders by former President Donald Trump. Burns has also creatively used intelligence on Ukraine to diminish Russian disinformation. Finally, Burns’ collegiality, having worked with National Security Adviser Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken for many years, has so far led to success as CIA director and has awarded him the trust of President Biden.

‘Wrong About Putin’: Did Germany and France Turn a Blind Eye to the Threat from Russia?

Benjamin Dodman, France24

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In the midst of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany and France are being criticized for more than a decade of appeasing President Putin and failing to recognize his true, imperialistic intentions. In a video message to Western leaders last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said, “I invite Ms. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy to visit Bucha and see what the policy of concessions to Russia has led to in 14 years.” Fourteen years ago, at a summit in Bucharest, NATO offered Georgia and Ukraine future membership in the alliance but without a timetable, a move which President Zelensky claims put Ukraine in a “grey zone” and exposed to Russian aggression. At this NATO summit, France and Germany argued it was too early for the two countries to join the alliance and feared such a move would compromise relations with Russia. Just four months after the 2008 NATO summit, Russia invaded Georgia in support of pro-Russian separatists in breakaway provinces (sound familiar?), and six years later Russia invaded Ukraine’s Donbas region and annexed Crimea. While it is impossible to know how Russia would have reacted if Georgia and Ukraine had been guaranteed a swift admission to the group, France and Germany’s decision at the 2008 summit was the beginning of more than a decade of ambivalent foreign policy and attempts to détente with Russia despite Putin’s repeated aggression. Even some of her closest aides have criticized former German Chancellor Angela Merkel for failing to bolster Germany’s military and for becoming much too dependent on Russian energy. The Nord Stream 2 – a $10 billion pipeline that bypasses Ukraine and doubles gas imports from Russia to Germany – has come under major scrutiny. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who served as foreign minister in two of Merkel’s cabinets, admitted that he made a “mistake” in pushing for Nord Stream 2 and misjudged Putin’s “imperial madness”. French President Emmanuel Macron also made a wrong assessment of Putin, engaging with Putin for too long and sending “mixed messages.” President Macron has been criticized for years of trying too hard to sway the Russian president, treating Putin to lavish receptions and summer retreats. Ultimately, Germany and France failed to address the red flags the rest of the Western world tried to bring to their attention and held onto the belief that Putin could be swayed for far too long.

The End of the Middle East

Marc Lynch, Foreign Affairs

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Washington’s “map” of the Middle East is becoming increasingly outdated. Generally, Washington has viewed the Middle East as the Arab world, plus Israel, Turkey, and Iran. This American concept of the Middle East has been based on geographic continuity, common-sense understandings of the region, and, most importantly, twentieth-century history. The author of this article, Marc Lynch, warns that US foreign policy “remains wedded to a far narrower mental map of the Middle East” than to the map being drawn by growing transregional connections. After World War II, the US State Department adopted the Anglo-French colonial concept of the Middle East with the following objectives for the region: maintain access to oil in the Arabian Peninsula, protect Israel, and keep former British and French possessions in North Africa out of the Soviet sphere of influence. Unifying trends and issues in the early years of the Cold War, such as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism and the Palestinian issue, reinforced the West’s political perception that the Middle East was a cultural-political unity rather than a region full of diverse social and political forces. The decades of attachment to this false perception have led to American failure to support real political reform in the Middle East. For example, the long-held Western idea that all Muslim countries are resistant to democracy does not take into account the participation of Muslims in many democracies outside of the Middle East and it ignores the real drivers behind autocracy in the region: “Western-backed oil monarchies and Arab strongmen with little accountability to their poorly governed citizens.” The increasing involvement of Arab countries in conflicts and political transitions outside of the Middle East’s traditional boundaries has also challenged America’s idea of a single geopolitical arena. An expansion of economic ties to Asia has done the same. 

The US-made map of the Middle East created 75 years ago made sense, especially considering America’s global primacy. However, in recent years regional powers have begun being redefined in the region. While the traditional zones of conflict remain (like Iran and its proxy networks), the Gulf States have become increasingly centered on the Indian Ocean while North African states have shifted to a trans-Sahel orientation. Furthermore, Washington has Beijing to contend with. China has a much different concept of the Middle East which follows its own strategic interests. It has downplayed the politics that the US has traditionally gotten wrapped up in and, instead, has chosen to put its effort towards energy and infrastructure projects. Lynch warns that by continuing to follow the same map drawn 75 years ago, “Washington risks truncating its understanding of the behavior and interests of the Middle East’s main players; misunderstanding the actions there of other global powers, such as China; and overestimating the effects of an American retreat.” Whether the US likes it or not, the map of the Middle East is being redrawn.