The world may be reaching another inflection point in the next few years. Instability (political, economic, social, financial) and upheaval may be reaching alarming levels. Consequently, the global balance of power may be shifting. The act of rebalancing the international order may exacerbate instability before or after the rebalancing is completed, in a manner similar to the developments prior to the Westphalian Treaty (1648), the Vienna Congress (1814), the Paris Treaty (1919), the Bretton Woods Agreement (1944), or the Camp David decisions (1971). In that spirit, we will be offering our readers a bi-weekly summary of 4-5 articles related to the geopolitical unfolding and the implications they may have for our lives.

China’s Radical New Vision Of Globalization

James Crabtree, Noema
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In August, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would be moving to a “dual circulation” economic strategy, in which it pulls back from globalization in favor of a more self-reliant approach. This worldview is far more pessimistic in nature than the previous policy, as China sees the US and its allies as denying it access to the technology it needs to achieve its goals. Chinese leaders now believe they will have to develop on their own, without input from the US or its friends. The Xi administration sees the world in two circles: a domestic ring which looks to develop internal supply chains, consumer demand, and technology, and an external circulation of global trade and foreign investment. With Western relations deteriorating amid the Trump administration’s trade war and an economy firmly in the middle class (with GDP per capita more on par with Kazakhstan than,say, Greece), China sees itself as an embattled power pulling itself up by its bootstraps. The central government has consolidated its control in key industries like telecom and defense, and this trend seems to be accelerating. Economists project that the dual circulation decoupling will slow growth and may cause innovation to stagnate as funds are channeled to white elephant investment projects. All this leaves the Biden administration with a difficult foreign relations quagmire to navigate.

The End of the Wilsonian Era

Walter Russell Mead, Foreign Affairs
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While the twentieth century and the first fifth of the twenty-first century have been shaped by Woodrow Wilson’s ideology of a league of cooperative powers bound under a democratic rule of law, the trajectory of the future is rapidly shifting away from Wilson’s ideals. One can see a number of driving factors to this shift: post-colonial power dynamics, technological advancements, ideology-fueled politics, and cultural-historical dynamics, to name a few, are all opposing or fracturing pressures on Wilson’s proposition of regulated peer rivalry. The rise of Russia and China are symptomatic of these changes. While the dissolution of international organizations may not come for years (if it comes at all for some powerful bureaucratic institutions like NATO or the UN), they will certainly be weakened as rival powers arise. Wilsonian cooperation has produced great benefits for those who have opted in: economic prosperity, technological innovation, the expansion of individual liberty, and checks on military escalation all number among its gifts. But the propagation of these boons has been driven by a distinctly Western liberal ideology, a philosophy which posits that as cultures observe the prosperity of liberal democracy and free enterprise, the currents of society will converge on what many now see as a distinctly European set of values. While European answers may be insufficient for Asian or African questions, it does not mean the answers themselves are meritless. Instead, let us take to heart the lessons of the past as we plan for the future, holding onto the flame of hope for a peaceful coexistence.

Joe Biden will face an inbox of complex foreign policy problems from the start

The Guardian 
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President-Elect Joe Biden will face a host of foreign policy challenges when he enters office, while at the same time having to confront the mounting pressures of the Covid-19 pandemic. Some “hangovers” from the Trump administration will be easier to remedy than others, such as rejoining the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Accord. On the other hand, Biden will have to navigate several tricky relationships including that with Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea.

The most immediate issue is how to respond to Russia if it is confirmed they are behind the massive hack of US federal agencies. So far, Biden has signaled a much more proactive stance towards Russia and state-sponsored hacking. When it comes to Iran, Biden will most likely reopen talks about a nuclear deal but he will face lobbying from Israel and Republicans in Congress who were against the original nuclear agreement. Furthermore, there are the complex issues of the ongoing trade dispute with China and North Korea that is now a nuclear power with long-range missile capabilities. Throughout Biden’s political career, he has been positioned towards a well-managed, technocratic foreign policy that leans on long-standing democratic institutions and alliances. While Biden will have to deal with foreign policy challenges that come with each nation, he will be tasked with re-orienting the US’ foreign policy approach away from the isolationism the Trump administration instituted. 

A review of the following three articles:

China is convinced that the Chinese national experience and the faltering of American global leadership have proven wrong the 20th-century ideal that democracy is superior to other forms of governance and is most conducive for national development and prosperity. “While democracies dither, China is silently undermining the roots of democracy throughout the world like a river systematically erodes the bank – even the mightiest tree must fall” (Gokhale). Xi Jinping has self-declared it China’s mission to become the world’s leading power by 2049. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy and a key element in XI Jinping’s plan to achieve this mission. 

However, the BRI has been struggling and China is coming to the realization that it is nearly impossible to replicate Chinese conditions in other societies; “It has taken a flawed model that appeared to work at home, building large infrastructure projects, and hubristically tried to apply that abroad” (Kyngeand and Wheatley). Lending from the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank fell to nearly $4 billion last year from a high of $75 billion in 2016. China has been pulling back on BRI projects partially because of slower economic growth, but also because it is facing a host of debt issues with the receiving countries. Developing countries participating in BRI projects were already struggling to make payments on loans prior to the coronavirus pandemic. While China has extended a loan grace period to countries struggling with the pandemic, debt servicing costs will soon eat up significant shares of public budgets, and many countries will be forced to default. Despite the risks and the slowdown, China hasn’t abandoned the BRI nor is it out of the realm of possibility that Chinese financing will not increase again in the future. 

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